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Abstract: In this paper, we study oligopolistic competition between closed and
open source softwares. By intersecting existing economic contributions on open source,
we propose a two stage game with perfect information and product di¤eretiation in
which producers rstly set softwares quality, then they determine prices (constrained
at zero for open source programs). In doing this, we explicitly model lock-in e¤ects,
network externality componentsof software quality as well as knowledge accumulation
in software use and implementation.
With respect to a monopolistic benchmark case, we argue that in duopoly a pro-
prietary sofware producer facing an open source software will reduce its selling price
whether: (i) its network of users is larger than open sources one and its consumers are
largely experienced on its program, (ii) it has a small network of un-skilled consumers.
In opposition, after open source softwares emergence, proprietary software price does
augment if proprietary software users form a large, but poorly skilled network. Fur-
thermore, we show that, in all above cases, proprietary software quality increases
because of the existence of a open source alternative to a previouisly monopolistic
program.
Finally, by modeling knowledge accumulation processes through di¤erence equa-
tions, we show that the ratio between closed and open source programsopportunity
costs of software learning and deployment plays a crucial role in shaping market out-
comes. Until an open source software remains too complex and technical for unskilled
or time-scarse users, a shared market solution in which both softwares are adopted is
predicted. In contrast, if opportunity costs in learning and understanding open source
programs are remarkably low, or at least equal to opportunity costs of a closed source
software, then a open source dominance outcome (i.e. all software are open ones)
phases out.
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1 Introduction
In the last years, Open Source Software (OSS, henceforth) has gained large
market shares in several computer software markets from server applications
to internet mail browers or audio editors. Surprisingly, even in the Microsoft-
dominated market for operative systems, Linux is receiving considerable atten-
tion by users and software developers. The reason of this success is threefold.
First of all, OSS is freely developed by hackers and freely distributed on
the web. Whether a nal user has su¢ ciently good skills in informatics, he or
she can download any needed program or utility to have a complete operative
system with several applications.
Secondly, OSS can be freely modied by manipulating its source and
compile codes. In this way, consumers can adapt operative systems peculiar-
ities to what they will do with that computer and with installed applications.
Moreover, any modication of the original program can be freely distributed
under a copyleft regime1 . Copyleft states that any modication of an open
source product can be freerly distributed together with its source and compile
codes at the condition that the licence grants similar rights over new modi-
cations. Thus, software recipients can modify the program and, at condition
that original authors are evidently quoted, can distribute their version of the
product to other users under a new copyleft licence. This permits decentralized
programming and networking among users.
Finally, frequent peer-to-peer exchanges of open sorce softwares modi-
cations and improvements create a sharing community from which free support
and consulting can be exchanged.
Indeed, the "gift and share" philosophy of open source communities have
posed some questions to economics. Among others: Why should developers
work on software improvements for free ? Which are main market e¤ects of
OSS di¤usion ? When will a user decide for the adoption of an OSS instead
of a proprietary one ? Which e¤ects will have the emergence of open source
alternatives on proprietary softwares price and quality ? And then, which
e¤ects on social welfare ?
As we review in the next section, some answers to above issues have
been proposed by the so called economics of open source. Nevertheless, at the
best of our knowledge, no papers have modeled competition between open and
closed softwares when vertical product di¤erentiation is allowed. Hence, in what
follows, we rstly discuss a monopolistic case in which only a proprietary product
exists, then we suggest a game in which competition between closed source and
open source softwares is studied with a model of oligopolistic competition on
price and quality (Shaked and Sutton (1982), Gabzewicz and Thisse (1979)).
More precisely, we propose a two stage game with perfect information in which
1For a denition of copyleft see GNU Project (2000).
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producers rstly set softwares quality, then determine selling prices (obviously
constrained at zero for OSS). In doing this, we will take into account lock-in
e¤ects, network externality componentsof software quality as well as knowledge
accumulation in software use, all crucial elements for shaping competition in
software markets (see Shy (2001)).
Our results show that in duopoly a proprietary sofware house, which faces an
open source software, reduces its selling price with respect to the monopolistic
case if: (i) its network of users is larger than open sources one and its con-
sumers are largely experienced on its program; (ii) its network of users is small
and largely un-skilled. In opposition, after open source softwares emergence,
proprietary software price does augment if proprietary software users form a
large, but poorly skilled, network. Furthermore, we show that, in all above
cases, proprietary software quality increases because of the existence of a open
source alternative to a previouisly monopolistic program.
Finally, by modeling knowledge accumulation processes through di¤erence
equations, we show that the ratio between closed and open source programsop-
portunity costs of software learning and deployment shapes market outcomes.
More precisesly, until open source softwares remain too complex and techni-
cal for unskilled or time-scarse users, a shared market solution in which both
softwares are adopted can be predicted. In contrast, whereas opportunity costs
in learning and understanding open source programs are remarkably low, or
at least equal to opportunity costs of closed source ones, then a open source
dominace solution (i.e. all software are open ones) phases out.
The analysis is organized as follows. In Section 2, in order to motivate
our set up,.we briey review existing economic literature on OSS. In Section 3,
we present our model together with basic denitions and notation. Price and
quality competition are analyzed in Section 4 in the case of exogeneously xed
usersknowledge and e¤ort in software learning. Such an assumption is removed
in Section 5 where knowledge accumulation dynamics with endogeneous e¤ort
in software learning and deployment are analyzed. As ususal, the last paragraph
briey concludes.
2 Economic Literature on Open Source
Economic analysis of OSS is relatively young. Its birth can be linked with
the publication of a short article in which Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole suggest
some research questions that the open source movement raises to economists
(Lerner and Tirole (2001)). So far, answers to these questions have been only
partially found by economic analysis. In this section, we present a selection of
these contributions2 .
2For a review on early results of the economics of open source see Schi¤ (2002). A more
recent survey on Open Source is Lerner and Tirole (2004).
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In a seminal paper, Lerner and Tirole (2002) discuss programmerseco-
nomic incentives to participate in OSS projects3 . Through a descriptive ap-
proach (i.e. some interviews with leaders of the OS movement), they are able
to identify immediate and delayed benets of participation. Lerner and Tirole
classify them as follows: (a) monetary compensations paid by programmers
employees for experience accumulation in software manipulation, (b) software
customization and bugs xing, (c) ego gratication through peer recognition,
and, (d) signalling purposes within programmerscommunities for career con-
cerns. As Lerner and Tirole argue, these expected payo¤s explain why sophisti-
cated users are likely to contribute to OSS projects. Because of their relatively
more advanced skills and lower opportunity costs of time, skilled programmers
or heavy and educated users receive large net benets from participation and
open source software adoption. The same cannot be said for un-skilled and light
users.
A di¤erent approach to explain participation is followed by Johnson
(2001). By using a game-theoretic set-up with n players, he models programmer
choice (participate vs not-participate) in the case of exogeneously xed benets
and costs of participation and some beliefs on other agents behaviour. His
results show that in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium a programmer participates to
OSS projects only if he/she benet-cost ratio is larger than a threshold that
increases with respect to the probability that a software development will be
implemented by another user. By increasing n, the likelihood that an agent
with large benet-cost ratio exist augments as well as incentives to free-ride
increase. Without particular assumptions on beliefs distribution, Johnson shows
that expected social welfare is increasing in n, i.e. larger OSS communities
provide larger benets to their members (the so called size-e¤ect).
Van Wegberg and Berends (2000) focus on software adoption by con-
sumers with di¤erent experiences and skills in software utilization and deploy-
ment. Software users maximize utility with respect to e¤ort in software devel-
opment and to the quantity of feedbacks (to other developers of open source
programs or to the proprietary software house). Any consumer can buy for an
OS program or a proprietary one and, in both cases, an higher level of e¤ort
increases usersexperience and utility. Moreover, whether a user adopts an open
source program his/her feedbacks create reputation within the OS community
and more dense peer-to-peer exchanges with larger communites increase users
utility. On the contrary, by adopting a closed source product, a consumer en-
larges software houses network and prots and thus its investment in software
quality.
By simulating models rst order conditions, Van Wegberg and Berends
(2000) show that: (a) skilled users opt for an OSS immediately after its release;
(b) an increase in highly-qualied pioneers augments the long-run number of
3 In this section, we do not discuss contributions in which social, collective or non-economic
motivations explain programmersbehaviour. On these issues see Hertel et. al (2003), Bonac-
corsi and Rossi (2003) and Zitlyn (2003).
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OSS users and overall OSS di¤usion. If a su¢ ciently large numbers of highly-
skilled programmers join to the OS community, low taleted users will adopt OSS
as well and the OSS will entirely dominate the market (open source dominance
solution). In opposition, whether initial adoption of the OSS is sticky and
only few pioneers participate in OS projects, larger network e¤ects motivate
the adoption of a proprietary product. In such a case, a shared market solution
emerges.
Competition between open and closed source softwares has been mod-
eled by Mustonen (2003), Scmidt and Schmitzer (2003), Lin (2004) and Gandel
(2004).
Gandel (2004) analyzes duopolistic competition between an OSS and
a proprietary one when the OSS so¤ers from costs of mis-coordination in de-
velopment (for instance, forking in code writing) and proprietary softwares
distribution costs are di¤erent from zero. Consumers are di¤erentiated not only
in terms of skills and experience, but also with respect to willingness to pay.
In Gandels framework, a shared market solution is always reached: low-income
consumers and well endowed-highly skilled users adopt an OSS, all others opt
for a proprietary product.
From a di¤erent viewpoint, Mustonen (2003) develops a two stage model
in which a monopolist with a copyright software rstly invests in his program
quality by hiring programmers, then it determines software selling price. The ex-
istance of a OSS constrains monopoly rms behaviour becuase consumers may
decide for a free software and programmers for participation in OSS projects.
Furthermore, users face non-negative implementation costs, i.e. costs of in-
stalling and learing the software. Mustonens results show that whether imple-
mentation costs are remarkably low some consumers prefer an OSS reducing
monopolists price and prot. In opposition, whether these costs are high, the
monopoly rm continues to set a monopolistic price for its product4 .
Similar conclusions are drawn by Lin (2004). By modeling duopolistic
competition between an OSS and a proprietary one in presence of heteroge-
neous consumers (in terms of skills and experience), implementation costs and
network e¤ects, she argues that if OSS is simply a cost-saving alternative to
the proprietary software, then the latter either shares the market with an OSS
or it becomes the unique adopted program. More precisely, whether agents are
highly skilled and experienced, many consumers adopt an OSS and the propri-
etary software house reacts by reducing its selling price to gain market share.
Such a price reduction will be so strong to cover the whole market5 . In oppo-
4There is also an intemediate case in which the proprietary software rm sets the minimun
price for detering the marginal consumers to switch to a copyleft program. For details, see
Mustonen (2003).
5Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) models competition between an OSS and a
proprietary one in presence of network e¤ects. Their results too indicate that the mergence
of an OSS lowers proprietary software price.
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sition, if agents are poorly skilled and experienced, few users choose an OSS
and the proprietary software house sets an higher price leaving market share
to its open source alternative. The only case in which the market tips to the
OSS is when it ensures better performances and provides customized benets
to users. Whether these benets are very large, the proprietary software rm
will continue to loose market share even if it reduces its selling price. If this is
the case, we get a dominance solution in which all existing softwares are open
source ones6 .
Finally, Schmidt and Schmitzer (2003) propose an Hotelling-inspired
model of spatial competition between a proprietary software and an OSS. In
their set-up, a group of user is locked-in with an OSS, another group is locked-
in with a proprietary program and only a third subset of consumers can choose
between a free OSS or a proprietary one. Programs are completely compatible
(hence network e¤ects ignored) and users face trasportation costs, i.e. costs of
adaptation of the program to their operative systems specicities. As Schmidt
and Schmitzer show, in equilibrium an larger number of OSS users (for instance,
obtained through public subsidies to open source) reduces proprietary software
houses prots and investment in R&D as well as an it increases proprietary
software price for locked-in consumers.
This last contribution can introduce us to our aims. In Schmidt and
Schmitzer (2003)s paper an increase in the number of OSSs users augments
proprietary software price and reduces rms prot and incentives to innovate.
This is caused by the fact that the proprietary software house will focus more
on the group of consumers that cannot adopt an OSS (i.e. locked-in users)
than on the set of undecided users. By increasing its selling price for locked-in
consumers, the proprietary software house tries to balance the reduced demand
for its product caused by the emergence of an OSS.
Hence, it seems that two price e¤ects can follow the introduction of
OSS in the software market: a proprietary softwares price cut to maintain
proprietary software houses market share and a price increase to get larger
prots from locked-in users. Nevertheless, in the existing literature, these two
e¤ects cannot co-exist in the same analytical set-up. Thus, our modest attempt
is to provide a set-up in which both e¤ects can be rationalized. Furthermore,
we show that the likelihood of an OS dominance solution depends on the rate of
experience accumulation for OSS with respect to proprietary ones. Accordingly
to Mustonen (2003), we argue that low implementation costs are crucial for
OSSs dominance.
6On convenience to release programs as OSS, Hawkins (2004) argues that whether techno-
logical spillovers (i.e. savings in software development costs by competitors R&D activites)
and related commercial activities(i.e. assistance or internet based connection with dedicated
portals) revenues are high, competitive rmsdominant strategy is to release its product under
a copyleft licence. These can also be new competitive dimensions in software markets with
skilled users and customized OSS.
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3 The Model
In this section we introduce denitions and notation. The set up proposed is
inspired to a well established tradition of models of duopolistic competition with
vertically di¤erentiated products and perfect information (Shaked and Sutton
(1982), Gabzewicz and Thisse (1979)) The main di¤erence with those models is
that we consider a prot-oriented rm (the software house) and a no-prot pro-
ducer (the OS community). Hereafter, we assume as exogeneously xed users
e¤ort in software learning and implementation. We shall drop this assumption
in Section 5.
3.1 The Demand Side
Let us suppose to have N undecided consumers equal in all respects except
for individual ability in software implementation, use and deployment (h). For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that individual abilities are uniformly distrib-
uted on

h;h

with h = h + 1. Any user can buy only a unit of product and
he/she can choose between a proprietary software (i) or an OSS (j). Let us
assume that h is su¢ ciently high to guarantee that even the least skilled user
adopts a software.
Consumerspreferences are represented by the following utility function:
uts = q
t
sh
tKts   pts   !tsets for s = i; j (1)
where qts is the software quality, K
t
s is consumers experience in software use
and deployment, ets indicates userse¤ort in software implementation, !
t
s the
monetary opportunity cost of such an e¤ort, pts is the price of software and t
denotes a time period. Obviously, ptj = 0:
As in Van Wegber and Berends (2000), usersexperience is increased by
e¤ort as well as decreased by knowledge dispersion and obsolescence. The fol-
lowing di¤erence equation characterizes the experience/knowledge accumulation
process:
Kts = (1  )Kt 1s + sets (2)
with s = i; j,  2 [0; 1] and s 2

;
	
.  is the knowledge dispersion
rate and s indicates the marginal productivity of e¤ort.
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Consistenly with the view of more active and dense feedbacks within
OSSs communities than between proprietary softwares consumers and produc-
ers7 , we assume that i =  < 1 and j =  < 1 with  < : Moreover, higher
technicality of OSS motivates the assumption that !tj > !
t
i.
As in Schmidt and Schmitzer (2003), accumulated knowledge in software
use and implementation can be only imperfectly transferred between softwares
such that swithcing costs are not equal to zero. In particular, we suppose that:
Kti = K
t
j (3)
Ktj = K
t
i
where  2 [0; 1) is a symmetric lock-in coe¢ cient.
Software quality is dened by a network externality component and an
hedonic component determined by using softwares average down-time and its
number of bugs. Formally, we write:
qts = 
 
bts

+ ts for s = i; j (4)
where bts 2 R+ is an exogeneously xed number of software users (installed
base, henceforth),  : R+ ! [0; 1] a fuzzy function with (bs < M) = 0
and 
 
bs M

= 1: As usual in fuzzy mathematics8 , zero stands for non-
achievement of network externalities and one for full achievement9 .
Finally, ts 2

; 

is an index of avarage software quality. Its upper
and lower bounds are given by the maximum quality attainable with existing
technologies and the minimum quality standard required by laws and regulators.
3.2 The Supply Side
On the supply side, we consider two players. On the one hand, a prot-
oriented software house (i) that produces a proprietary software sold at a pos-
itive price pti > 0. Production costs are given by a constant marginal cost of
distribution, c > 0, zero replication costs and totally paid-o¤ xed costs of
7On this issue see Lakhani and Von Hippel (2003).
8See Zadek (1965).
9Note that full exploitation of the network component of quality is ensured if bs M and
null expoitation if bs < M . Both M and M are critical bounds in networks size. By assuming
that 
0
> 0 in

M ;M

, we roughtly approssimate a logistic curve.
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software creation. Indeed, this cost structure violates some traditional assump-
tions on costs-subadditivity in software markets (Shy (2001)). Nevertheless, it is
particularly meaningfull whether we want to analyze e¤ects of an OSS in pre-
viously monopolistic markets dominated by well established (and well paid-o¤)
softwares.
Let us denote with Dti = Di
 
pti; q
t
i ; q
t
j

the demand for proprietary soft-
ware with
@Dti
@pti
< 0,
@Dti
@qti
> 0 and
@Dti
@qtj
< 0. Thus, rm is decisional problem
is given by:
max
pti;
t
i
ti = D
t
i
 
pti   c

(5)
On the other hand, we consider an OSSs community that freely develops
and distributes its software (i.e. ptj = cj = 0) and faces a demand equal to
Dtj = Dj
 
pti; q
t
i ; q
t
j

with
@Dtj
@pti
> 0,
@Dtj
@qti
< 0,
@Dtj
@qtj
> 0 and Dtj +D
t
i = N . Let
us suppose that the OSScommunity objective is to include the largest share of
the population of users. Consistently, we describe player js decision problem
as follows:
max
tj
Dtj = N  Dti (6)
Finally, let us suppose that quality and price decisions are assumed
sequentially and that the interaction between players has the form of a a two
stage game with perfect and complete information. In the rst stage of the
game, players decide productsquality, then, in the latter stage, rm i decides
its selling price. As usual, we use a backward induction procedure and derive
subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
4 Some Competitive E¤ects of Open Source
In this section, in order to analyze how the introduction of an OSS changes
price and quality decisions of a proprietary software house we compare results
in the case of oligopolistic competition with a benchmark monopoly case.
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4.1 A Monopolistic Software House
Suppose that no OSS exists. Users have to decide whether or not to but
a proprietary software. Obviously, only consumers with uti  0 will buy the
program. In this case, rm is demand is equal to:
Dti = N

h  bh (7)
with bh = pti + !tieti
qtiK
t
i
and monopoly prots
 
Mi

are given by
Mi = N

1  p
t
i + !
t
ie
t
i
qtiK
t
i
+ h
 
pti   c

(8)
By maximizing (8) with respect to pti, it is straightforward to notice
that:
pMi =
1
2

(1 + h) qtiK
t
i  
!tiH
t
i

+ c

(9)
with Hti = 4Ki + Kti and eti =
Hti

:
As it can be pointed out by looking at expression (9), the monopoly
price increases with respect to software quality and costs as well as with re-
spect to users assumulated experience in software use and implementation
(Kti ). Furthermore, p
M
i decreases with respect to usersopportunity costs and
in correspondence to an increase in the degree of knowledge dispersion (Kti ) or
knowledge accumulation (4Ki). In other words, a monopolistic software house
charges an high price for high quality/well-known software for which experience
and knowledge accumulation is slow and a huge stock of accumulated experi-
ence characterizes users. On the contrary, the monopolist sets a low price for
new (Kti small), low-quality products for which knowledge accumulation and
dispersion rates are high.
Whether we use (9) and (4) in (8), we get prot in the quality stage of
the game, these are given by:
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Mi = N

h  1
((bti)+ti)Kti
h
1
2

(1 + h)
 
bti + 
t
i

Kti   !
t
iH
t
i
 + c

+ !ti
Hti

i
h
1
2

h
 
bti + 
t
i

Kti   !
t
iH
t
i
 + c

  c
i
(10)
By looking at (10), it can be easily checked that conditions for an interior
solution hold. Therefore, by maximizing (10) with respect to ti, it can be shown
that equilibrium quality is equal to:
Mi +(bi) =

(!iHi + c)
 
!iHi + c
1=2
Ki (h+ 1)
<  +(bi) (11)
4.2 Duopolistic Competition
Next, let us consider the case in which a proprietary software compete with
a freely developed and distributed OSS. Now, a user will prefer an OSS if and
only if utj  uti or if
ht  !
t
jH
t
j   !tiHti   pti 
qtj   qti
  
Ktj  Kti


= eh (12)
with Hts = 4Ks + Kts and ets =
Hts
s
for s = i; j. Consistently with Van
Wegberg and Bedenrs (2000) and Lin (2004), expression (12) states that highly
skilled users adopt an OSS. In this case, playersobjective funtions are given
by:
ti = N
heh  hi  pti   c = N
"
!tjH
t
j   !tiHti   pti 
qtj   qti
  
Ktj  Kti


  h
#  
pti   c

(13)
Dtj = N
h
h  ehi = N "h  !tjHtj   !tiHti   pti 
qtj   qti
  
Ktj  Kti


#
(14)
In the second stage of the game, rm i sets its best reply to a null price
of an OSS. Hence. by maximizing (13) with respect to pti, we can determine the
optimal proprietary software price given by:
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pi =
1
2

!tjH
t
j   !tiHti + c  h
 
(btj) + 
t
j  (bti) + ti
  
Ktj  Kti



(15)
We are equipped to show the following:
Proposition 1 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, both players imple-
ments.the maximum level of software hedonic quality.
Proof. By substituting (15) in (13) and (14) we obtain rst stage payo¤s. These are
given by:
ti = N

!tjH
t
j !tiHti  12 [!tjHtj !tiHti+c h((btj)+tj (bti)+ti)(Ktj Kti)]
((btj)+tj (bti)+ti)(Ktj Kti)
  h

(16) 
1
2

!tjH
t
j   !tiHti + c  h
 
(btj) + 
t
j  (bti) + ti
  
Ktj  Kti


  c
and
Dtj= N

h  !
t
jH
t
j !tiHti  12 [!tjHtj !tiHti+c h((btj)+tj (bti)+ti)(Ktj Kti)]
((btj)+tj (bti)+ti)(Ktj Kti)

(17)
Given that
@ti
@ti
> 0 and
@tj
@tj
> 0, it does not exist an interior Nash equilibrium
in the second stage of the game. A corner solution, in which both players implement
the maximum level of product hedonic quality, holds i.e.
 
i ; 

j

=
 
; 

:
By comparing Proposition 1s insights with (11), we are able to stress a
rst e¤ect of the introduction of OSS in software markets. In order to attract in
the community the largest number of users, the OS developers release an highest
quality program. Hence, the proprietary software house increases its product
quality (with respect to the monopoly case) in order to not loose market share.
Quality imitation at the highest level leads to a minimum di¤erentiation result.
Furthermore, the existence of a freely distributed and developed pro-
gram produces di¤erent e¤ects on software is price in correspondence with
di¤erent levels of experience accumulation and with respect to the relative num-
ber of users of each software. Let us rstly deal with the more realistic case of
(bti) (btj)  0:
With a larger installed base for the proprietary software than for the
OS one, rm is second stage prots are non-negative only if proprietary soft-
wares users have large experience in software use and implementation compared
with users of OSS (i:e: Kti   Ktj > 0). Whether the experience accumulation
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advantage of proprietary software is su¢ ciently large, lock-in e¤ect are strong.
Therefore, the proprietary software house augments its selling price on these
users to compensate its reduced market share. On the contrary, whether the
di¤erence in knowledge accumulation between the two programs is small, some
users could switch to OSS and rm i decides for a price cut. Last statements
are formally proved in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 With (bti) (btj)  0; in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
a proprietary software price is lower (resp. higher) than in the monopoly case
if and only if Kti  Ktj   > 0 (resp Kti  Ktj < ):
Proof. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the price of the proprietary software
is equal to:
pi=
1
2

!tjH
t
j   !tiHti + c  h
 
(btj) (bti)
  
Ktj  Kti



(18)
By comparing (18) with (9) it is immediate to show that:
pi pMi , Kti Ktj

(!iHi + c)
 
!iHi + c
1=2
+ 2!tjH
t
j   !tiHti
h((btj) (bti))
=  > 0
(19)
Otherwise, the opposite holds.
With (bti)   (btj) < 0, rm is second stage prots are non-negative
only if Kti  Ktj < 0, i.e. buyers of proprietary software are few poorly skilled
and experienced users for which an OSS is too technical and complex. In such
a case, the proprietary software house always reduces its product price with
respect to the monopoly case. Formally,
Proposition 3 With (bti) (btj) < 0; in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
a proprietary software price is always lower than in the monopoly case.
Proof. As for Proposition 2, we have to compare (18) and (9). In this case, we have
that:
pi pMi , Kti Ktj<

(!iHi + c)
 
!iHi + c
1=2   2!tjHtj   !tiHti
h((btj) (bti))
> 0
(20)
Expression (20) always holds given that Kti   Ktj has to be negative to avoid a
degenerate solution.
Whether we suppose that (bti)   (btj) < 0 and Kti   Ktj  0 or
(bti)   (btj)  0 and Kti   Ktj < 0; some other solutions emerge. Under
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these specications of our parameters, software houses equilibrium prots are
negative for any selling price. In the rst case, larger network e¤ects within the
OS community attract well-skilled and experienced consumers of proprietary
softwares which accept a certain amount of knowledge dispersion to benet of
larger network e¤ects. In the second one, large experience accumulation in
OSS makes the market for a proprietary software excessively thin for protable
production. In both scenarios, the optimal choice for a proprietary software
house is to switch to an OS module for its product or to exit.
Finally, with some comparative statics it is easy to check how pro-
prietary softwares price changes with di¤erent knowledge dispersion rates or
lock-in coe¢ cients. For the sake of tractability, let us assume that  =  = b.
By di¤erentiating (18) with respect to  and , it can be shown that:
@pi
@
=
b
2
 
!tj   !ti

Kt 1j > 0 (21)
@pi
@
=  
b!ti
2

Ktj   (1  )Kt 1j

< 0 , Ktj   (1  )Kt 1j  0 (22)
Expressions (21) points out that pi always increases with high knowl-
edge dispersion and particularly skittish experience accumulation in proprietary
software use and implementation. Larger values of  reinforce lock-in e¤ect and
this allows rm i to charge an higher price. This intuition is rened by ex-
pression (22): if the lock-in coe¢ cient diminishes, accumulated knolwdge in one
software can be transferred on the competing one only by incurring in large
losses. Consistently, lock-in increases when users are accumulating experience
through software utilization
 
i.e. Ktj   (1  )Kt 1j  0

10 while it diminishes
if knowledge and experience in software implementation and use decreases in
time.
5 Knowledge Accumulation Paths and OSS Dom-
inance
OS softwares are new comers in the market and their relative di¤usion
is not large. Since, in our set up, OSS dominance is predicted for the cases
of larger installed base of users ((bti)   (btj) < 0 and Kti   Ktj  0) and
larger accumulated knowledge in software deployment ((bti)   (btj)  0 and
Kti   Ktj < 0), it is not meaningless to study how dynamics of knowledge
10Note that by using (3) it can be shown that Ktj   (1   )Kt 1j  0 implies Kti   (1  
)Kt 1i  0.
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accumulation are shaped. In order to perform this task, we need to analyze
time paths of knowledge accumulation by using (2) and by endogenizing agents
e¤ort in software use and implemetation. By studying di¤erence equations with
endogeneous e¤ort, we shall assess that OSS may dominate the market only
with low opportunity costs of OSS learning and use are assured through low
implementation costs. In all other cases, the OSS is a niche alternative to
proprietary softwares for well-skilled users.
5.1 Endogeneous E¤ort
In our set up, usersdecision problem can be described as a constrained
utility maximization problem given by:
max
es
ut = qtsh
tKts   pts   !tsets (23)
s.t: ps + !
t
se
t
s = I (24)
and Kts = (1  )Kt 1s + sets (25)
where I is income and s = i; j . By substituing (24) and (25) in (23)
and by taking the rst order condition, we get that:
es =
I   ps
!s
(26)
with ei =
I   pi
!ti
, ej =
I
!tj
and !tj > !
t
i. As it is straightforward to
notice, ej  ei if
I
!tj
 I   p

i
!ti
or, equivalently, if
!j
!i
 I
I   pi
. More explicitly,
endogeneous e¤ort in OSS deployment and implemetation will be stronger than
e¤ort spent on a proprietary product only if the opportunity cost ratio between
softwares

 =
!tj
!ti
, henceforth

is lower than a threshold which decreases with
respect to users income and increases with respect to proprietary softwares
price. Thus, OSS induces stronger e¤ort in software use and implementation
within populations of poorly endowed users who pay wide price margins to soft-
ware houses. In opposition, wealthy consumers in competitive software markets
deeply su¤er high OSS use opportunity costs. In this case, consumers are likely
to prefer a more simple proprietary product.
By substituing (26) in (2), we have a complete specication of knowl-
edge/experience accumulation euqations for both software. These are, respec-
tively for an OSS and a proprietary one, given by:
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Ktj  Kt 1j = 
I
!j
  Kt 1j (27)
Kti  Kt 1i = 
I   pi
!i
  Kt 1i
= 
I  12 [!
t
jH
t
j !tiHti+c h((btj) (bti))(Ktj Kti)]
!i
  Kt 1i (28)
In the next section, with no loss of generality, we deal with the simple
case of (btj) (bti) = 0: In doing this, we consider two separate scenarios. A
rst case in which no knowledge/experience dispersion takes place and a more
general one where dispersion of accumulated knowledge is allowed.
5.2 Knowledge Accumulation without Dispersion
In order to analyze knowledge accumulation paths, we have to manipulate
expressions (27) and (28). By recalling that Hts = 4Ks+ Kts, it can be shown
that above di¤erence equations can be written as:
Ktj + (   1)Kt 1j = 
I
!j
(29)
Kti + (   1)Kt 1i =

!i
 I
!i
(30)
with  =
4I+c
2(2 ) and  =
2
2  . Whether  = 0, (29) and (30) are rst
order di¤erence equations of the form:
yt+1 + ayt = k (31)
with a =  1 and k 6= 011 : Their general solutions are given by the sum
of two components: a particular integral (that is, any solution of (31)) and a
complementary function (i.e. the solution of the reduced version of (31) with
k = 0). In our case, general solutions of expressions (29) and (30) are given by:
Kti = K
0
i +


!i
 I
!i

t (32)
11On rst order di¤erence equations see Chiang (1994) pp. 502-530.
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Ktj = K
0
j +


I
!j

t (33)
where K0s 2 R+ indicates initial conditions for s = i; j: As above, the novelty
of OSS allows us to suppose that K0i  K0j , i.e. initial accumulated knowledge
for an OSS is lower than that for a proprietary products. Then, by using (32)
and (33), we get the following:
Proposition 4 OSS dominates in software markets only if  < I
 I : In
opposition, whether   I
 I a shared market solution is reached.
Proof. Compare expressions (32) and (33)s slope. Straightforwardly, we have:

!i
 I
!i
 I
!j
, !
t
j
!ti
(=  )  I
 I (34)
In this case, given that K0i  K0j , accumulation paths for an OSS will never lead
to larger stocks of knowledge with respect to
those for proprietary products. Hence, by recalling above discussion, we can con-
clude that a proprietary software will be not
driven out from the market. On the contrary, whether  < I
 I ; knowledge
accumulation paths for an OSS are steeper that
those referred to a proprietary product. If this is the case, identical initial condi-
tions (K0i = K
0
j ) do involve immediate OSS
dominance since Ktj > K
t
i for any t 6= 0. Otherwise, if K0i > K0j , Ktj > Kti only
if t > t =
K0i  K0jh
 I!j +
I
!i
  !i
i :
Open source dominance is hence predicted only in the case that the
opportunity costs ratio between software is su¢ ciently low, that is either the
OSS is relatively simpler than the proprietary one or peer-to-peer reviews for
OSS are su¢ ciently strong to compensate its higher technicality. With low OSS
implementation costs or huge knowledge sharing among users, knowledge accu-
mulation paths in OSS use and deployment are steeper than their proprietary
couterparts. If this is the case, with K0i > K
0
j OSS will dominate the market
after a certain lapse of time (t). In opposition, with K0i = K
0
j , OSS domi-
nance is predicted immediately after its release. As we will discuss in the next
paragraph, these conclusions also hold if knowledge dispersion is allowed (i.e.
 6= 0).
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5.3 Knowledge Accumulation with Dispersion
Let us conclude by assuming that  6= 0. For K0i = K0j = 0, expressions
(29) and (30) are rst order di¤erence equations like (31) with a 6=  1 and
k 6= 0. Thus, general solutions of exponential form are given by:
Kti =  
1



!i
 I
!i

(1  )t + 1



!i
 I
!i

(35)
Ktj =

 

I
!j

(1  )t + 

I
!j
(36)
Exactly as above, OSS dominance is predicted immediately after its
release if Ktj > K
t
i for any t 6= 0, condition veried if  < I I . In opposition,
whether   I
 I , the two softwares share the market.
Finally, if K0i > K
0
j and  <
I
 I , an OSS dominance solution is
reached after
t = ln1 
"
1 +
 
K0i  K0j

!i!j
I!i   !j
 
 I
#
(37)
periods of time.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, competitive e¤ects of OSS have been analyzed and discussed
. Roughtly speaking, the emergence of open source programs of high quality in
monopolistic software markets entails:
 a positive imitative e¤ect that increases proprietary software quality;
 a reduction in proprietary software house market share and prots;
 whether the proprietary softwares network of users is small or largely
un-skilled (or both), a reduction in proprietary software price;
nevertheless:
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 the proprietary software price increases if the adoption of a closed source
program ensures large network e¤ects among lockedin users.
Given our results, a welfare analysis of OSS is not strightforward. First
of all, we have to decline what welfare means for members of communities.
Consumerssurplus is unlikely a good measure of OS users satisfaction as far
as ego-gratication concerns, peer-recognition and ethical motives matter in OS
communites. Secondly, even whether we accept a surplus-oriented notion of
welfare our results shows that both an higher or a lower price for a proprietary
software can follow the emergence of an OSS in the market. In particular, higher
software quality and lower prices increases consumers surplus at the expences of
software houses prots. Whether the former increases more than the latter, an
increase in social welfare should be predictable. Nevertheless, it is also possible
that, after the emergence of an OSS, large, locked-in networks of un-skilled
users of a proprietary software face higher prices for imitative products. This
could be harmful for social welfare. Surely, more investigations are needed
on welfare consequences of open source. This is particularly true if open and
closed source programs share markets characterized by large networks of locked-
in users. However, at the current stage of debate on the issue, any conclusion
in favour or not to open source from a social welfare perspective is premature.
Finally, our discussion of OSS dominace solutions shows that with low
opportunity costs in OSS learing and use, the market may tip to an outcome
in which all software o¤er an open source. Since, for instance, low opportu-
nity costs may be assured by publicy provided and nanced education on open
source program (see alumni e¤ect), the role of the public sector in fostering open
source di¤usion may be articulate. Governments can adopt an OSS in public
departments and bureaus as well as they can directly subsidize free software
foudations or associations of OSS developers or foster OSS use within the ed-
ucational system. Unfortunately, any conclusion about public policies for open
source waits for welfare foundations.
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